Friday, January 17, 2048

林森池的投資十戒

林森池1969年初己涉足香港股市。1972年受聘於英國維高達證券公司(香港分行),成為"在職受訓"(Trainee)證券分析員,對香港上市的股票進行基礎分析。他的經驗值得參考﹕-


一、 戒短線急攻近利買賣,不要貪圖蠅頭小利。

二、戒被捲入狂潮的洪流,不要被外來不理性的亢奮,令你跟隨潮流作出投資。例如科網泡沫、地產狂潮等都是好例子,2000年買入科網股,或1997年地產高峰時買入住所,你都會很痛苦。最近,澳門賭業概念股急升,亦是活生生的例子。

三、不要被貪婪及無理性恐懼控制投資決定。股市大崩潰時群眾的拋售,一定會導致你產生恐懼。這時候你要克服恐懼,作出人棄我取,購入「千里馬」。

四、戒買新股。 畢非德從不買入新股,這是他的成功要素之一。他作出投資決定前,必須分析公司過往的業績。

五、避開所有衍生工具,林治和畢非德同樣認為政府要取締衍生工具。衍生工具的經營者,就是天空中的獵鷹,無時無刻窺伺你的小雞蛋。

六、戒聽流言或「貼士」,流言會令人疏於學習,不做自己應做的工作,迷失方向,不從事正確的分析。

七、不要過分分散投資。這個世界「千里馬」不多。過分分散投資,會拖低你的投資回報,好的「千里馬」可能三、五隻已經足夠。

八、不要買落後股。落後的馬匹很難有奇?出現再迎頭趕上,公司股價表現落後,背後一定有其原因,你要細加分析,不要有撿便宜的心態。

九、避開他人的「婚禮」。從過往收購合併的經驗中,筆者發覺很多「婚姻」都是悲劇收場,例如盈科收購香港電訊就是最好的例子。1973年置地收購牛奶,至今置地股價仍沒法回復當年水平。

十、戒有「刀仔鋸大樹」的心態。緊記投資是一門嚴肅的工作,並非「六合彩」的賭博。筆者年輕時也有同樣的心態,認為一家小公司能夠順利發展的話,從小到大的增長過程,會比市值大的公司快,這個概念是錯誤的。

理 論上,每個行業都會經歷起飛階段,但當一個行業起飛時,並非所有公司都能在起飛階段得益,從事同樣行業的小公司,在經營方面是有意想不到的掣肘,令到他們 比大公司落後。例如大公司現金流充足,在重新投資的時候,規模比較大,所以爭取到經濟效益,增長會較快;小型公司除了面對資金的掣肘外,其他方面如內部監 管、管理層的誠信、品牌的建立等,所面對的困難會比大公司為多。「細細粒,容易食」的心態是絕對要避免的。

舉例說,八十年代航運業出現困 難,包玉剛系的隆豐投資,可以成功轉型收購九倉,因為公司有足夠的規模,得到銀行的支持。另一家大公司和記洋行,1974 年出現財務困難,但由於規模太大,香港不容許這樣大規模的企業倒閉,所以由匯豐銀行接管,最後將控制權賣給長實,成為今天的和黃。同樣情況,今時今日在中 國大陸,國務院絕對不容許中國人壽破產。一旦出現的話,其影響太深遠,社會不能承擔。但是上海地產、歐亞農業,都是可以置之不理的公司,可以隨時人間蒸 發,也無傷大雅,損失的只是無知的小投資者。2004年10月20日,《亞洲華爾街日報》透露,投資老將林治亦損手於細價股。2003年林治購入一百八十 萬股SafeScript Pharmacies Inc.,相當於該公司8%股權。2004年10月,美國證監會向該公司的前管理層提出訴訟,認為管理層曾經誇大營業額與溢利,股價當然應聲下跌,林治亦 措手不及,只有認命。管理層的人事關係及誠信,往往是小公司的無法茁壯成長的要素。

Thursday, April 19, 2046

林森池的分析公司的工具 - 八種分析公司的工具

在網上可以到聯交所的網址(www.hkex.com.hk)索取公司的業績報告、年報及上市文件等。其次,有很多分析比例的定義,可以到以下網址:(www.investopedia.com)找尋
。另一個重要網址是恆生指數服務有限公司(www.hsi.com)。這個網址相當有用,包括了恆指每隻股份在指數里的比重,也可找到恆指的市盈率及息率,及其他指數的數據。
若你不喜歡用計算機,可以從大會堂圖書館或中央圖書館的參考叢書,尋找公司的資料。若真有興趣成為一個專業分析員,或想深入理解財務報告的分析,則要尋找教科書的
協作,一本有用的書是:The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements(Gerald White),這是一本考取CFA的教科書,對一般投資者會苦澀一些,然而這不是必讀的書,
只是當你希望深造時才有需要。
如何利用分析比例來分析公司年報:
(一)市盈率(PE Ratio)的正確用途
市盈率是一個誤導的比率,正確的用法是將市盈率倒轉,將盈利除以市價,得出一個盈利回報。筆者強調要用盈利回報率,不用市盈率,避免混淆。例如市盈率20倍,盈利回
報率則為1/20,即5%的回報。一個5%的回報可以直接與長期債券回報作一比較,不會因為20倍而受到誤導。
市盈率的正確用法,並非用來衡量一家公司的市價是否便宜,正確的使用法,是將市盈率除以公司盈利增長率,得出的係數來比較。例如A公司市盈率20倍,公司盈利增長率為
20%,得出的係數為1。B公司的市盈率為15倍,而盈利增長率為10%,所得係數為1.5。換言之,雖然A公司市盈率較高,但因為有較高的增長率,所以反而較B公司便宜。這就是
(PE/Growth)的用法。
(二)邊際利潤率(Profit Margin)是一個相當有用的指標
這是在選股過程中必用的指標。可以用毛利率或純利率來計算。將銷售額扣除經營成本,得出溢利總額,將溢利總額與銷售額作比較便是毛利率。而純利率則是將股東應占純
利與銷售額作比較。純利率包涵很多不同因素,例如兩家公司從事同一行業,但是他們在負債、機器設備的折舊率方面不同,結果其純利率將會有所不同;毛利率只是比較生
產或運作的毛利,不是比較公司的賺錢能力。毛利率適用於工業類公司,當工業產品已經達到國際水平,標籤化,用毛利率來比較,可以看到公司生產過程的經濟效益。這是
毛利率的作用,相當有局限性。
純利率對投資者更加實用,它反映了公司的借貸及其他成本,也反映了設備的更新及折舊,更反映了稅率等各方面因素,故此,比毛利率全面得多。最好的方法是將同類型公
司整合為一組作出比較,表22是簡單例子。
表22:電訊股的純利率比較
電訊行業 2003年上半營業額 2004年上半營業額 2003年上半純利(RMBM) 2004年上半純利(RMBM) 2003年純率 2004年純利率 (RMBM) (RMBM) 中移動 76,657 86,420 17,469 18,828 23% 22%中電信 74,068 80,217 13,058 14,708 18% 18%中聯通 31,967 39,372 2,385 2,809 7% 7%行業總數 182,692 206,009 32,912 36,345 18% 17.60%

從表22觀察3家中國電訊公司的純利率,可以看到中聯通的純利率是最低的,2003年及2004年上半年都是7%;只及中移動的三分之一。這是響起的警鐘,中聯通在營運方面是
否出現問題呢?在折舊、利息開支是否較其他電訊企業大呢?所以開始便用純利率比較同一行業的公司,可以提高我們的警覺性。稍後於第八篇,筆者分析電訊股時,再詳加
解釋。
分析毛利率或純利率時,要特別留意以下的數種情況:
1.以上海實業作為例子,2004年上半年,其純利大增89%,至9.3億港元,其中大部分來自中芯國際上市時,出售其部分股份所獲得的利潤。反而經常性業務出現倒退,所以要
將這些非經常性的項目剔除,才能夠計算純利率。
2.汽車行業也有些特別情況。例如駿威汽車在年報中的營業額不多,沒有包括與日本本田合作在廣州生產汽車的銷售額。駿威持有這家聯營公司不足50%的股權,以應占盈利(
Equity Accounting)作收入。因此要計算純利率的話,要花些時間在年報的附註中,找出聯營公司的營業額。
3.很多商品行業或運輸行業,像海運或航空事業,他們的純利率波動性很大。商品行業的純利極受商品價格波動所影響,例如石油價格變動對油公司的純利影響。運輸業的固
定成本相當高,所以在逆境時容易出現虧損。在順境時,其純利可以突然大增,令純利率上升。對欠缺穩定純利的公司,純利率這個比例往往失去指標的作用。
(三)回報率
看公司的回報,最簡易的方法是看股東資金回報率(Return On Equity)或者資產回報率(Return On Asset)。股東資金回報率,是將公司純利除以股東資金,資產回報率計
算方法有二:第一是將純利除以公司的總資產;第二是將純利加上利息支出,再除以總資產,後者稱為利息前資產回報率(Pre-interest Return)。利息前回報,是主要用於
某些資本性投資特別大的行業,例如發電企業,因為貸款特別大,若利率的波動對純利出現影響,用利息前回報更能看到真正的經營狀況。
(四)金融行業的回報指標
分析銀行及保險業會用不同的比例,銀行業我們會用壞帳與總貸款相除,(Bad Debt/Total Advances);保險業有同一類的性質,會用賠償與總保金收入相除,
(Claims/Total Premiums)。還有一個最重要的指標,就是成本與收入比例,(Cost/Income Ratio)。筆者在此不作例子了,因為稍後在分析銀行業時會實際加以運用。
(五)公司財務狀況的穩健性指標
包括負債與股東資金比率(Debt/ Equity Ratio),即將所有長短負債除以股東資金;另外還有經營現金流(Operating Cash Flow),即將純利加上折舊及攤銷,然後減去股
息開支。現金流與資本開支比率(Cash Flow/Capex Ratio)。
(六)資產淨值指標
資產淨值(Net Book Value)最適合用於金融服務業、地產業或其他資源股份如石油、煤及礦產等。這個指標可以在買入股票時與市價作一比較。筆者在分析石油股及銀行股
時,再討論如何找出資產淨值的方法。
(七)收購價的指標(EV/EBITDA)
企業價值(Enterprise Value)與除稅、利息、折舊及攤銷前溢利(EBITDA)相除。企業價值的定義,是公司市值加上負債及優先股,減去現金或現金等值投資。近年分析員
喜歡用這個指標,來衡量公司是否值得投資。這個指標是投資銀行家,用作衡量收購時所付出的估價值,EV等於理論上的收購價。理論收購價與公司的毛利現金流(EBITDA)
作一比較,認為可以在多少年內回本,即毛利可以在多少年內抵消收購價。實際上筆者對此比例抱有很大的懷疑。2000年穆迪投資有一份刊物,批評用EBITDA作指標的不可靠
性。因為有很多行業,像石油業、高科技業等,折舊及攤銷是非常龐大的,需要大量資金來再重新投資新的科技或新的勘探工作,所以這個「現金流」不可視作股東投資的收
入。石油的勘探可能是毫無結果,但其開支則是必然的,因此折舊不可視為公司賺錢能力的一部分。科技的投資與鑽油的情況相似,投資未必有豐厚的結果。
筆者稍後剖析華能國電時,會用這個比例,來衡量華能2004年收購5家發電廠的收購價是否合理。這個指標最適合應用於運作較穩定的行業如發電,其設施壽命相對較長,可
以維持15-20年以上,當除稅、利息、折舊及攤銷前收入(即是毛利)能夠在短時間內抵消收購價的話,電廠餘下的運作時間便變成無本生利,提高投資吸引力。
(八)現金流折現法
現金流折現法(Discounted Cash Flow)是投資最常用的工具之一。例如一個地產發展項目,需時多年才能完成,唯一的方法要假設樓宇建築期需要的建築費、利息開支作為
成本之一,然後在若干年後,賣出時所得回來的銷售額,減去這些成本及要支付的稅項,將溢利以折現率,折現成為現時的價值。例如一個地產項目需時5年才能完成,賣出
後扣除建築成本、利息開支及稅項後,連地價的現金流為1億元,以5%的折現率計算,這5年後的1億元相等現時的7,835萬元。計算方法相當簡單,將1億元乘以表23中的5%、5
年的係數0.783526。在其他行業分析我們也可以用現金流折現法,尤其是作長遠投資的時候。
表23:現金流折現係數一覽表
年份 / 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%折現率 1 0.961538 0.952381 0.943396 0.934579 0.925926 0.917431 0.9090912 0.9294556 0.907029 0.889996 0.873439 0.857339 0.84168 0.826446. . . . . . . .5 0.821927 0.783526 0.747258 0.712986 0.680583 0.649931 0.620921. . . . . . . .30 0.308319 0.231377 0.17411 0.131367 0.099377 0.075371 0.057309

Friday, January 19, 2046

曹仁超 - 投資守則

一、寧買當頭起,莫買當頭跌。最佳入貨訊號係投資對象上升10-15%後。例如金價2001年4月 2日見二百五十五元九角美元,上升10-15%即見二百八十一元五角至二百九十
四元三角,係最佳買入訊號,上述訊號去年1月已出現,即2002年起對黃金態度係逢低吸,直到有一天金價回落10-15%才平倉(依家最高見三百五十四美元,即止蝕位⑹三百
零一美元!)。
二、睇實、睇實再睇實。任何投資項目買入後必須睇實,股票如此,物業如此、債券亦如此。股票必須每周檢討其方向是否改變;債券必須每月檢討方向有冇改變;物業亦必
須每季檢討方向,千萬不可買入後放十年八載便以為天降財富。天下間冇咁便宜的事,一旦方向改變立即離開。
三、去年同新城電台搞「曹仁超投資智慧」,介紹KISS理論(Keep It Simple, Stupid !),任何投資自己無法理解者最好唔參與。其實發達可以好簡單!KISS另一解釋
係Keep It Safe, Smartguy !(安全第一,醒目仔)!許多人一味努力賺錢,而唔知道唔蝕錢更重要!成功與失敗不在閣下賺得快而在乎閣下留低幾多!97年時千萬富翁隨街
走,一項冇科學根據嘅統計指出,當時等巴士長龍中有百分之七十二點五係千萬富翁(住緊げ層樓已值近千萬矣),但今時今日千萬富翁漸成稀有品種……。點解會咁?因為太
多人留「佢」唔住,一味死博爛博而唔懂得持盈保泰,97年唔少千萬富翁今天淪為負資產一族。
四、困難日子唔代表冇銀搵。例如8x9年x六x四x事件後已證明乃入市最佳時機;97年8月本港樓市出問題,都係投資英、美、澳洲等地物業最佳時機;甚至 2002年投資外匯及
黃金者一樣獲可觀利潤。賺錢如發掘寶藏,必須有藏寶圖、刻苦及鍥而不舍的精神,然後找到定位,一舉而成功(但分分鐘失效)。
五、唔好問和尚借梳。有D所謂投資專家,自己都係負資產人士,又點可以教識你發達之道?大部分證券行內從業員職責唔係為你賺錢,而係為自己賺取傭金。因此唔好向經
紀諮詢投資意見,只可利用經紀代你完成買賣,因為佢地唔係受訓做投資顧問,佢地嘅責任只係代客買賣股票。學嘢應請教投資已成功的人士,而非自己投資失敗而改行做投
資專家的人士(對唔住!又得罪人);股票市場可以賺錢理由皆因別人犯錯!股票市場永遠係少數人賺大多數人蝕的地方。 ----------
在投資之前有冇問問自己:
一、該公司係咪一間穩健及有聲譽的公司?它是否擁有良好及有效率的管理層?
二、該公司生產什麽或提供什麽服務?在可見將來,社會對該產品或服務需求怎樣?
三、該公司從事的行業是否面對過分激烈競爭?它是否處於有利地位?
四、公司策略制訂者是否有遠見及進取?同時有冇過分擴充,令財政出現困難?
五、有冇細看公司資產負債表,核數師的評語如何(依家應該加上げ個核數師是否誠信可靠)?
六、公司過去有冇良好純利紀錄及合理派息政策,如有段日子唔派息,有冇好好解釋理由?理由是否充分?
七、公司中長期貸款及短期貸款有冇超過安全極限?該公司股價⑹過去有冇大幅波動或無法解釋的波幅? ----- 其實投資好簡單,挑選優質股買入,直到股價上升一倍或以上才考慮獲利回吐,再用止蝕盤保護,以防自己分析錯誤,如此一來虧損被局限在15%之內;至於利潤,不妨
讓它往前跑,通常獲利100%是最起碼要求,不少情況下利潤可達200%或以上。
-------- 發達容易搵食更艱難
我老曹相信差唔多任何人都可發達,發達並唔需要特別天才、家庭背景甚至學歷。我老曹曾經寫過「發達容易,搵食艱難」,即發達較搵食容易,但點解社會上咁少人發達?
理由係95%そ人響發達過程中犯錯,事關佢地唔記得開門七件事:
甲、誤信貼士。太多人唔做功課,睇報紙大標題買股票,如果D專家咁叻,點解佢地自己未發達?如果你停留響聽貼士水平,我老曹保證你冇發達!
乙、識乜唔重要,認識邊個才重要。請多點交朋友,我老曹係指可互相扶持的朋友,而非豬朋狗友。如果你同猴子在一起,你的思想行為遲早同猴子接近。
丙、做事要專心。唔少人以為別人發達係勤力,其實剛相反,世上最勤力的人通常從事低收入工作,富人工作時間並唔長但專心,一旦投入工作往往可廢寢忘餐,直到工作完
成或上軌道後交畀屬下員工為止。
丁、誤信錢搵錢,以為自己窮係上一代冇蚊年剩落。事實上,唔少人富有的理由便是上一代貧窮,佢地立心脫離窮籍,結果錢愈賺愈多,最後富甲一方。佢地そ致富之道係一
旦機會來臨便利用槓桿原理(不懂借錢的人唔會發達,亂借錢的人很快破產),因此佢そ財富唔只由一百萬元變成二百萬元,而係由一千萬元變成一億元。換言之,看準機會
響一段時間(例如十年)內令財富高速增長,然後及時減債便可以印印腳矣。
戊、大富由天、小富由儉,呢個世界冇天時地利人和,你唔可能成為蓋茨、畢非德或李實發,呢類人一千萬人中少於兩個,真係一命二運三風水……。對一般人而言,一千萬元
應該十分吸引,如你肯花三十年時間去達到上述數字,人人可以做到,並非白日夢。
己、好多人話「財富係一項負擔」,呢句話係講畀窮人聽そ,唔好信。財富絕對唔係一項負擔,你可以交畀私人銀行負責或請專人負責。財富的好處係令你財政獨立,唔使為
幾萬銀折腰,可從心所欲地去做自己喜歡的事。
庚、富有的人視賺錢為一種興趣而非一項苦差,一如我老曹每天寫呢個專欄三十年不變,有人問辛唔辛苦?答案係有時冇材料都幾辛苦,除此之外都係樂趣,希望讀者透過我
老曹提供的財務意見改善自己理財方法;同時,在為讀者搜尋資料過程中,我老曹亦搵到投資機會。任何視賺錢為苦差者一定唔會發達。
在此順便重溫我老曹的「投資哲學」-A、不要趁低買入,因為你唔知幾時才係最低,寧買當頭起,莫買當頭跌;B、永遠記住行使止蝕,防止小損失變成大損失;C、買賣前先做功課;D、財富係透過逐小逐小累積起來的,唔好期望一朝發達;E、冇必勝投資但有必勝投資策略。 --------- 有D投資戒條連我老曹自己亦可能忘記,在此同各位重溫。
一、無論情況如何緊記溝上唔溝落。
二、股票市場係賺錢地方,因此絕對要跟紅頂白而非鋤強扶弱,幾時都應吸納強勢股,沽出弱勢股。
三、持有蝕本股不放有兩大損失:A、股價上嘅損失;B、失去將資金投資其他項目嘅損失。因此絕對要止蝕。
四、股市唔係低價買入高價賣出嘅地方(冇人做得到),應該高價買入更高價賣出,因此宜高追不宜趁低買入。
五、牛市中錯失獲利機會冇有怕,因為下一浪更高;熊市中寧可賺少D,亦不應太遲離市。
六、股市表現可能同自己想法背馳好耐,所以淡市莫估底,旺市莫估頂。
七、第一次出現裂口上升時不妨買入;如出現裂口回落係時候離開。
八、旺市時不妨膽大D,因為形勢在我;淡市時少玩,因為氹仔浸死人。
九、投資成功先了解基本因素,再利用技術分析決定買賣時機,只識技術分析唔了解基本因素者,只係花拳繡腿(睇得但唔打得)。
十、升市將盡小心「單日轉向」或「單周轉向」走勢,通常幾有用。最簡單的技術分析最有用,太複雜的技術分析只係用嚟嚇初學者。
十一、了解群眾心理亦十分有用,因群眾常常睇錯市。
十二、止蝕唔止賺,通常賣出之後股價才大升,我地少賺50%或以上。獲利回吐易,止蝕賣出難,只有克服上述心理,才能在股市立足。 ----------- 寧願蝕息不可蝕價
股聖畢非德旗下巴郡哈撒韋透露去年度手上現金高達三百六十億美元(2002年年底只有一百三十億美元),響現今低利率情況下,點解保留咁多茄殊在手?投資涉及兩問題:
一B賺息(例如存款有利息、買樓有租收、買股票有股息、買債券有債息);二、賺價(外匯有波動、樓價有升降、股價有上落、債券價格可升可跌)。一般人過分強調賺息,
因為仍需要利息收入去改善生活素質;有錢人卻強調賺價,因為佢地嘅收入已唔再需要收息。令你富有嘅係賺價,唔係賺息;令你貪窮嘅亦係蝕價,唔係蝕息。1997年8月買樓
收租至今,結果七年租金收入抵不上樓價回落;反之,過去三年摣金冇息收,但卻可賺價。雖然黃金冇利息,但金價上升60%,跑贏過去三年樓價!
股份亦一樣,高息股通常唔係增長股,而且隨時面對派息減少甚至唔派息;增長股從來唔可能派高息,因為資金有更佳用途。合理股息應響三厘半之下,一旦高於三厘半,已
再唔係增長股。有時客觀情況係面對蝕息或蝕價嘅問題,畢非德教曉我地寧可蝕息,不可蝕價。 --------各位應緊記以下八大格言:一、訂立守則管制自己行為(例如止蝕沽盤);二、不要只見高回報率,忽略高風險所在;三、未買先賣(未買入任何投資前,先計計自己可以輸幾多);四、不可承擔超過自己能力的投資(例如有三十萬元炒一百萬元貨);五、不可感情支配理智(面對損失之時因輸唔起而感情用事);六、不可自己冇主見而誤聽別人意見(忘記真主意、假商量守則);七、不可冇為自己行為負責的性格;八、切勿忘記以上七大格言。

Sunday, November 15, 2009

If This Is Recovery... - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

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Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
If This Is Recovery...
by John Mauldin
November 13, 2009
Visit John's Home Page

In this issue:
If This is Recovery, Where Are the Taxes?
Last Business Standing
Stimulus, What Stimulus?
The Reality of Unemployment
Let the Good Times Roll
The Quick Double-Dip Scenario
Phoenix, New York, and Thoughts on the Internet

No one goes into Wal-Mart and asks to pay extra sales tax. Thus sales taxes are reasonable barometers for retail sales. This week we look at how taxes are doing in a period of economic recovery. Then we turn our eyes to a very interesting (and sobering) analysis of possible future unemployment rates. This is an anecdote to the happy-face analysis of employment numbers you get from establishment economists. There will be a lot of charts and tables, so this letter may print a little longer, but I think you will find it very interesting.

If This is Recovery, Where Are the Taxes?

I keep reading about surveys that show that retail sales are up. But as noted above, no one pays extra sales taxes, or decides they need to pay more income taxes. The surest way to measure retail sales is sales taxes. Want to know how incomes are doing? Look at income tax receipts. Let's look at sales taxes first.

First off, I can find no single source of recent sales tax information. It is all one-off, but it is consistent. Sales taxes in my home state of Texas are down 12.8% year-over-year, and we're in the fifth straight month of decreases of 11% or more. Projections are for sales taxes to continue to decline into 2010.

There is a very revealing study by the Pew Center on state taxes, called "Beyond California" (http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/). Everyone knows how bad California is. The Pew Center looks at how the rest of the states are doing, and focuses on 10 states that also have severe problems. Sales tax receipts are down 14% in Arizona, and state income taxes are down 32%.

On average, revenues are down almost 12%. Oregon has seen their revenues collapse a stunning 19%. New York is down 17%, with a deficit of 32%. Illinois has a projected deficit of 47% of its budget, second only to California with 49%. You can see how your state fares at http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates.org/Beyond_California_Appendix.pdf.

The Liscio Report notes that all states had negative year-over-year sales tax collections in October, and the weighted average decrease was 10.2%, down from a negative 7.2% in September. (www.theliscioreport.com)

Sales at Wal-Mart stores slipped by 0.4% in the third quarter. Actual government figures show that retail sales were down 1.5% in September from the previous month and 5.8% year-over-year. So how do we keep seeing headlines about retail sales being up, as unemployment keeps rising?

Remember that such reports are usually based on surveys, and generally cover mid-sized and up retailers, leaving out smaller businesses. Further, if you are a retail chain that has closed 10% of its stores, the remaining stores should in theory benefit from getting your loyal customers into them.

Last Business Standing

Yesterday I was with an associate, and I hesitated in asking them how their business was doing, because I knew things had been tough at the beginning of the year. But I did ask, and they said sales were up over the last months and business was looking better. Surprised, I asked them what made the difference. "Ah," they said, "less competition. Our competitors have gone out of business."

Best Buy and other electronic retailers had to benefit from Circuit City disappearing. That is Schumpeter's creative destruction at work. Not very good for total employment, but it does help the profitability of the survivors.

So, if things are so bad, how did we have 3.5% growth in the third quarter? First off, things are not as bad as they were in the past year. We are in fact getting close to an economic bottom, at least for now. Second, the 3.5% number is a preliminary estimate. A study by Goldman Sachs suggests that the number will be revised down by at least 0.5% and maybe as much as 1%.

Why? The estimate does not really take into account how poorly small businesses are performing. If you look at small-business indexes and compare them to historical GDP numbers, you get the smaller number mentioned above. And since at least 2% of the GDP was from the stimulus package (Cash for Clunkers, houses, tax cuts), the economy on its own was flat. That begs the question, what happens when the stimulus runs out?

And the answer is that we won't know for some time, as the stimulus is just getting ramped up. "According to CBO estimates, only 21% of [the stimulus] spending will occur in 2009; another 38% will come in 2010, and 22% in 2011. After that, its effect will dissipate quickly." (The Liscio Report)

But David Rosenberg notes that what the federal government is giving, the states are taking away. The Pew Study shows that at least nine other states are in appalling shape, so it is no wonder that David writes:

Stimulus, What Stimulus?

"Fully nine states are in fiscal distress and only two have balanced budgets. States like Michigan are planning 20% budget cuts for the coming year. Indiana is planning a 10% spending cut in light of a 7.4% YoY revenue decline. How can the economy really be out of recession if government revenues are still deflating?

"The states are filling around 40% of their fiscal gaps with the federal stimulus (so much for spending on "shovel ready" infrastructure projects). Even after the fiscal help from Washington, the state governments will still face a projected deficit of $142 billion for 2011 (versus $113 billion in 2010). All in, the restraint in the state and local government sector is estimated to drain a full percentage point from U.S. GDP growth in 2010 and more than fully offset the stimulative efforts from Washington. The U.S. economy is more likely to post growth of little more than 2% next year, rather than the 5% currently being discounted by the equity market."

The Reality of Unemployment

All this is, of course, going to put continued pressure on employment. As I noted last week, the number of unemployed actually soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey, not the 190,000 you read about in the mainstream media. Unemployment is sadly continuing to rise by significant amounts.

In August, I did an interview with CNBC from Leen's Fishing Lodge in Maine. The unemployment numbers had just come out. I did a back-of-the-napkin estimate that we would need about 15 million new jobs over the next five years just to get back to where we were when the recession started.

That works out to a need for about 125,000 new jobs each month to handle new workers coming into the market (which comes to a total of 7.5 million over five years), plus the 8 million and rising jobs we've lost. That is a daunting number. It amounts to 250,000 new jobs a month every month for five years. And we are still losing more than that number a month, let alone adding the needed 250,000.

Look at the chart below. It shows the establishment survey employment figures for the last ten years. Only once, in 1999, did we actually add over 250,000 jobs a month for a whole year. And that was during the internet boom.

jm111309image001

Sadly, the private sector has shed over 300,000 jobs since 1999. Think about that. We have had a decade where there have been no new jobs added by the private sector. Real incomes are roughly where they were, and the stock market is down. Talk about a lost decade.

I love it when someone does the really heavy lifting for me, and my friend Mike Shedlock of Sitka Pacific Capital Management has done a wonderful job of taking that speculation of mine and putting it into a spreadsheet that helps us get a real handle on what unemployment is likely to look like for the next ten years. I am going to make use of his basic analysis and then modify some of his assumptions in the spreadsheet he provided me, in order to think about different scenarios.

All three scenarios are based on assumptions, so let's see what Mish started with. There is a wealth of data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. According to the Census Bureau Population Estimates we are going to add about 2.5 million working-age (16 years old and up) citizens a year, from now until 2020. The numbers varies slightly year to year. Mish used an estimate of the average, summing up the buckets from 16 to 100+ for the years in question and rounding the result.

You can go to the BLS site and look at Table A-1, which shows the civilian noninstitutional population (those over 16 not in prisons), the participation rate (those who are working and/or want to work), the unemployment rate, the number employed, those not in the labor force, and those who want a job. Those are starting numbers for the charts below.

For those interested, you can read Mish's very full (and quite detailed) analysis at his blog site http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/mish-unemployment-projections-through.html). But let's look at his assumptions:

  • Job losses are likely to continue for a minimum of another year.
  • When job gains start, they will be very slow at first, then pick up.
  • An extremely generous monthly job gain stat over the course of the year would be 150,000 jobs.
  • A falling participation rate (boomers retiring) will continue to mask reported unemployment.
  • Starting in 2013 the labor pool will start decreasing because of Boomer demographics.
  • The noninstitutional population will rise by 2.5 million workers a year.

The spreadsheet below needs a little explanation. Let's start with the assumptions. Mike starts with current working-age population and adds 2.5 million people a year. He assumes that Boomers will retire at 65 (something which all the surveys say is not going to happen). And his last estimate is what the unemployment numbers will be. Everything else is based on those assumptions, which leads to the first column, or the expected unemployment number.

By the way, we know that everyone will want to make different assumptions. I am going to create three scenarios, but you can go to Mike's blog and at the bottom of the post is a link to the actual spreadsheet. Have fun. Let's look at scenario 1.

jm111309image002

This assumes there is no double-dip recession, and jobs roughly rise along the same lines as the last recovery. Actually, Mish is far more optimistic, as in the very first chart you will notice that job losses were negative in the first year after the end of the recession and flat the second year. Mish has jobs rising by 120,000 next year and 600,000 the second year (2011), and then a fairly robust recovery. Below is the graph of the unemployment numbers under such a scenario.

jm111309image003

Notice that unemployment stays at or above 11% for three years. Pessimistic? Mainstream and usually very optimistic Mark Zandi of www.economy.com predicted this week that unemployment would rise to 11% by the middle of next year, right in line with this scenario. Also note that total jobs rise by 14 million over ten years. Hardly doom and gloom. Again, Boomers all retire on time and there is no double-dip recession.

Let the Good Times Roll

What would it take to get back to 5% unemployment? I played with the spreadsheet and came up with the following numbers, which get us below 5% by 2020. I assume no recessions for the next ten years, and 2 million new jobs a year after 2011, which I start off with almost 1.5 million jobs. Of course, we have never done that, but let's be optimistic.

jm111309image004

And the graph below shows the unemployment numbers for the Good Times Scenario.

jm111309image005

Want to get to 5% within five years? Add 3 million jobs a year starting now. With no housing recovery, a smaller auto industry, and financial firms getting leaner.

The Quick Double-Dip Scenario

When I called the last two recessions about a year before they happened, it was not all that hard. We had inverted yield curves, falling leading indicators, and a lot of other data that pretty much pointed to a recession. Believing that we had a housing bubble and a looming credit crisis also helped my conviction in calling the last recession.

I think we are in for a double-dip recession in 2011, yet I readily admit there will be little if any statistical evidence in advance this time. This is more of an instinct call. I have serious doubts that we can have what amounts to the largest tax increase of all time in what will be a very weak (albeit growing) economy, without putting us back into recession. And Speaker Pelosi thinks it is a smart thing to add another 5.4% surtax on what will already be a rising capital gains and dividend tax.

Taxing small businesses, and that is what the tax increase amounts to, is a very bad idea in a weak economy. Small businesses are where the job growth comes from. Taking money from productive businesses and giving it to government is a fundamentally flawed concept.

Now, if they decide to postpone the tax increase, or phase it in slowly, then maybe we avoid the double dip. But right now it doesn't look like that will be the case. So, let's quickly see what a double-dip scenario might look like. Let's be optimistic and assume we only lose another 1.2 million jobs in the next recession, since we have already lost so many in this one (8 million and counting). And then the economy comes roaring back in 2012 with 1.5 million jobs and continues to grow rather smartly for the rest of the decade. No further recession. We absorb the tax increases and move on with our economic lives.

Unemployment under such a scenario would rise to just under 13% and stay above 10% for 8 years. Take a look at the chart and graph.

jm111309image006

jm111309image007

Think 13% is too dire? This week David Rosenberg said unemployment would rise to between 12-13%. The former Merrill Lynch economist was one of the few mainstream economists who called the recession and the credit crisis. The so-called "Blue Chip" economists told us at the beginning of 2008 that unemployment would peak out at 6%. While Rosie is not optimistic of late, he has a rather solid record of being right.

We are at 10.2% unemployment today. The economy lost jobs for 21 months after the end of the last recession. That would easily take us into 2011. Another million lost jobs will take us well over 11% and close to 12% (remember, you have to add in the increasing population), even without my double-dip scenario.

The letter is getting long and it's getting late, so let me close with a few thoughts.

First, 12% unemployment is horrendous by American standards. But Spain is now at 20%, and much of Europe has been in the 10% range for years.

Second, Americans are not used to the concept of 12% unemployment or 10% rates for extended periods. That is going to cause a serious backlash across the political spectrum. Couple that with the discomfort over $1.5-trillion deficits and there could be some serious political changes in the coming years. I think the message will be more anti-incumbent than one party or the other.

Third, the only way out of this morass is to create an environment where small business can thrive. As I've noted for the last several weeks in this letter, government spending does not increase GDP over time. It is a temporary nonproductive stimulus. It takes private investment to create jobs and increase productivity. Over the next few months, I will write more about how to do that.

Phoenix, New York, and Thoughts on the Internet

Next week I take a quick one-day trip to Phoenix, then back to do a satellite-remote speech to a South African hedge fund conference. I will be in New York the first weekend of December (the 4th) for Festivus, a great fundraiser for kids sponsored by Todd Harrison and the team at Minyanville (http://www.rpfoundation.org). Interestingly, they hold it every year at a "Texas" barbecue joint. Look me up if you are there.

The 7 kids, spouses, and grandkids are starting to gather. We will all have brunch Sunday and then a shower for Tiffani. She has another 6 weeks before she is due, and she is really uncomfortable. Walking is literally a pain.

Permit me to reminisce. A little over 9 years ago I started this letter on the internet with about 2,000 email addresses. It was a new version of what had been a print letter, as that was the business I knew. The internet was still a new thing to me, but it seemed like a good idea at the time. Little did I know.

I am still amazed at the growth and the direction my business and life have taken. My letters are sent out by various publishers and affiliates to over 1.5 million readers and posted on dozens of web sites, and the numbers have been growing rapidly of late. I am grateful. But I wonder what would happen if I started it today. Ten years ago there was little in the way of free economic letters. Not a lot of competition.

Today, there is so much free information that it's staggering. There have to be thousands of blogs and hundreds of free letters, some with very large circulations. It seems a new star is born every few months. While much of it does not add to the level of conversation, some of it is quite excellent. I think I am lucky to have started when I did.

And I am grateful for the kind attention you give me. As I turn 60, I note that this has been a rather overwhelming last ten years. A lot of changes for me, and almost all of them very good. But there are more to come. The last two flights I was on I was connected to the internet at 35,000 feet. I sense a lot more changes coming. I am thinking a lot about how to keep up and not get left behind, how to make sure that you, gentle reader, continue to get my best. That is what, at the end of the day, drives me.

Have a great week. I know I shall. Dad loves it when his kids (from 15 to 32) and spouses and grandkids are all under one roof.

Your amazed at it all analyst,

John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com

Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

Note: The generic Accredited Investor E-letters are not an offering for any investment. It represents only the opinions of John Mauldin and Millennium Wave Investments. It is intended solely for accredited investors who have registered with Millennium Wave Investments and Altegris Investments at www.accreditedinvestor.ws or directly related websites and have been so registered for no less than 30 days. The Accredited Investor E-Letter is provided on a confidential basis, and subscribers to the Accredited Investor E-Letter are not to send this letter to anyone other than their professional investment counselors. Investors should discuss any investment with their personal investment counsel. John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA), which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS), an FINRA registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. Millennium Wave Investments cooperates in the consulting on and marketing of private investment offerings with other independent firms such as Altegris Investments; Absolute Return Partners, LLP; Fynn Capital; Nicola Wealth Management; and Plexus Asset Management. Funds recommended by Mauldin may pay a portion of their fees to these independent firms, who will share 1/3 of those fees with MWS and thus with Mauldin. Any views expressed herein are provided for information purposes only and should not be construed in any way as an offer, an endorsement, or inducement to invest with any CTA, fund, or program mentioned here or elsewhere. Before seeking any advisor's services or making an investment in a fund, investors must read and examine thoroughly the respective disclosure document or offering memorandum. Since these firms and Mauldin receive fees from the funds they recommend/market, they only recommend/market products with which they have been able to negotiate fee arrangements.

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PAST RESULTS ARE NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THERE IS RISK OF LOSS AS WELL AS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GAIN WHEN INVESTING IN MANAGED FUNDS. WHEN CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, INCLUDING HEDGE FUNDS, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER VARIOUS RISKS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT SOME PRODUCTS: OFTEN ENGAGE IN LEVERAGING AND OTHER SPECULATIVE INVESTMENT PRACTICES THAT MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF INVESTMENT LOSS, CAN BE ILLIQUID, ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PERIODIC PRICING OR VALUATION INFORMATION TO INVESTORS, MAY INVOLVE COMPLEX TAX STRUCTURES AND DELAYS IN DISTRIBUTING IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AS MUTUAL FUNDS, OFTEN CHARGE HIGH FEES, AND IN MANY CASES THE UNDERLYING INVESTMENTS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT AND ARE KNOWN ONLY TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGER.

John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA) which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) an NASD registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions.

Opinions expressed in these reports may change without prior notice. John Mauldin and/or the staffs at Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC may or may not have investments in any funds cited above. John Mauldin can be reached at 800-829-7273.


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Thoughts from the Frontline
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Saturday, November 7, 2009

The Glide Path Option - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

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Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
The Glide Path Option
by John Mauldin
November 6, 2009
Visit John's Home Page

In this issue:
The Present Contains All Possible Futures
The Ugly Unemployment Numbers
Argentinian Disease
The Austrian Solution
The Eastern European Solution
Japanese Disease
The Glide Path Option
Philadelphia, Orlando, and Phoenix

The present contains all possible futures. But not all futures are good ones. Some can be quite cruel. The one we actually get is dictated by the choices we make. For the last few months I have been addressing the choices in front of us, economically speaking. Today I am going to summarize them, and maybe we can look for some signposts that will tell us which path we're headed down. For those who are new readers and who would like a more in-depth analysis, you can go to the archives at www.2000wave.com and search for terms I am writing about. And I will start out by briefly touching on today's ugly unemployment numbers, with data you did not get in the mainstream media.

But first, let me welcome the readers of EQUITIES Magazine to this letter. The publisher is sending the letter to you directly. This letter is free, and all you have to do to continue receiving it is type in your email address at www.2000wave.com. Likewise, I have arranged for my regular readers to get a free subscription to EQUITIES Magazine, if you would like. You can go to www.equitiesmagazine.com. For those who don't know, I write a brief monthly column for them.

The Ugly Unemployment Numbers

The headlines said unemployment, as measured by the "establishment survey," was down by 190,000; and even though that was slightly worse than forecast, market bulls were cheered by the fact that the number was not as bad as last month's. It is an improvement that we are not falling as fast.

Well, maybe. What I did not see in many of the stories I read was that the number of unemployed actually soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey. The establishment survey polls larger businesses; the household survey actually calls individual households.

Let's look at the real number in the establishment survey. If you don't seasonally adjust the number, the actual change in unemployment for October was 641,000, or about 450,000 more than the seasonally adjusted number. And the Bureau of Labor Statistics added 86,000 jobs that they simply guess were created through the so-called birth-death ratio. Interestingly, the birth-death ratio number is not seasonally adjusted, so it is just added to the unemployment number. http://www.bls.gov/web/cesbd.htm

The total (U-6) employment rate is at a record high of 17.5% (this includes those who are part-time for economic reasons). There are now over 10.5 million people who have lost their jobs since the beginning of the downturn.

My favorite slicer and dicer of data, Greg Weldon (www.weldononline.com), offers up an even more horrific number. As I have noted before, if you have not looked for work in the last four weeks, the BLS does not count you as unemployed. Quoting Greg:

"Moreover, when we combine the monthly change in the number of Unemployed, with the number Not in the Labor Force, we might consider the result to be a proxy for the actual 'change' in the underlying labor market situation ... in which case, October's figure of 817,000 represents the fourth LARGEST yet, behind last month's (September's) second largest figure of 1,021,000 ... for a two-month combined figure of 1.838 million, in newly Unemployed, or no longer 'in' the Labor Force ...

"... the second LARGEST two-month total EVER posted, barely trailing the December-08/January-09 total 1.955 million.

"Bottom line ... basis this measure AND the 'Total Unemployment Rate,' we could conclude that not only is there NO 'improvement' in the labor market, but moreover, that it continues to DETERIORATE, intently."

There are plenty more implications in the data, but let's turn to the topic of the day.

The Present Contains All Possible Futures

Like teenagers, we as a US polity have made a number of bad choices over the past decade. We allowed banks to overleverage and, in the case of AIG (and others), sell what were essentially naked call options of credit default swaps, based on their firm balance sheets, far in excess of their net worth; and that put our entire financial system at risk. We gave mortgages to people who could not pay them, and did so in such large amounts that we again brought down the entire world financial system to the point that only with staggering amounts of taxpayer money was it brought back from the brink of Armageddon. We assumed that home prices were not in a bubble but were a permanent fixture of ever-rising value, and we borrowed against our homes to finance what seemed like the perfect lifestyle. We did not regulate the mortgage markets. We ran large and growing government deficits. We did not save enough. We allowed rating agencies to degrade their ratings to a point where they no longer meant anything. The list is much longer, but you get the idea.

Now, we are faced with a continuing crisis and the aftermath of multiple bubbles bursting. We are left with a massive government deficit and growing public debt, record unemployment, and consumers who are desperately trying to repair their balance sheets.

If present trends are left unchecked, we will need to find $15 trillion in the next ten years, just to pay for US government debt, let alone state, county, and city debt. And perhaps some loans for business will be needed? Where can all this money come from? The answer is that it can't be found. Long before we get to 2019 there will be an upheaval in the market, forcing what could be unpleasant changes.

We are left with no good choices, only bad ones. We have created a situation that is going to cause a lot of pain. It is not a question of pain or no pain, it is just when and how we decide (or are forced) to take it. There are no easy paths, but some bad choices are less bad than others. So, let's review some of the choices we can make. (Again, I am being very general here. You can go to the archives for more specifics. This is a summary letter.)

Argentinian Disease

One way to deal with the deficit is to do what Argentina and other countries have done: simply print the money needed to cover the deficits. Of course, that eventually means hyperinflation and the collapse of the currency and all debt. There are writers who think this is an inevitable outcome. How else, they ask, can we deal with the debt? Where is the political willpower?

One large hedge-fund manager in Brazil humorously remarked that Argentina is a binomial country. When faced with two choices (hence binomial) they always made the bad choice. Could it happen here?

Hyperinflation is not an economic event; it is a political choice. I think last Tuesday's election is a sign that the voter population is beginning to pay attention to the need for something more than talk of change. There is growing discomfort with the size of the deficits. Further, the Fed would have to cooperate in order for there to be hyperinflation, and I think there is only a very slight (as in almost zero) chance of that happening. Could Congress change the rules and take over the Fed? Anything's possible, but I seriously doubt there is any appetite in saner Democratic circles for such a thing to happen.

I think the chances of hyperinflation in the US are quite low. It would be the worst of all possible bad choices.

The Austrian Solution

Here I refer to the Austrian school of economic theory, based on the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, et al. There are those in the Austrian camp who argue the need to do away with the Fed, return to the gold standard, allow the banks that are now deemed too big to fail to go ahead and fail, along with any businesses that are also mismanaged (such as GM and Chrysler), and leave the high ground to new and more properly run.

In their model, government spending is slashed to the bone, as are (in most cases) taxes. The advantage is that, in theory, you get all your pain at once and then can begin to recover from what would be a very bad and deep recession. The bad news is that you risk getting 30% unemployment and another depression that could take a very long time to climb out of.

Now, let me say that I have GREATLY simplified their argument. If you want to learn more you can go to www.mises.org. It is an excellent web site for all things Austrian. While I am not Austrian, I have spent a lot of time reading the literature and have certain sympathies for this view.

That being said, this also has almost no chance of being implemented. In Congress, only my friend Ron Paul is its advocate. Most Austrian followers are Libertarian by nature, and that is just not a political reality for the coming decade.

The Eastern European Solution

As it turned out, Niall Ferguson (last week I wrote about his brilliant book, The Ascent of Money) was in Dallas last night, and I was graciously invited to hear him. He gave a great speech and signed books, and then we went to a local bar and proceeded to solve the world's problems over Scotch (Niall) and tequila (me), and went farther into the night than we originally intended. He's a very fun and knowledgeable guy.

As we were talking about possible paths, he brought one to mind that I hadn't thought of. He reminded me of the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as the nations of Eastern Europe broke from the former Soviet Union. They started with very weak economies and simply overhauled their entire governments and economies in a rather short period of time, though not in lockstep with one another. Privatization, lowered taxes, etc. were the order of the day.

We here in the US are always talking about the need for reform. We need to reform health care or education or energy. In Eastern Europe they did not reform in the sense that we use the word. In many cases they simply started from scratch and built new systems. They had the advantage that there was general agreement that things did not work the way they had been, so there was more room for change.

Today in the US there are large constituencies that resist change. We only get to tinker around the edges, when real structural change is needed. Sadly, we agreed that here there is not much chance of major change. We can't even get the obvious changes needed in the financial regulatory world.

Sidebar: I am outraged at the paltry proposed financial "reforms." Rahm Emanuel said that no crisis should be allowed to go to waste. The Obama administration is wasting this one. How can we allow banks to be too big to fail? Where is the reinstatement of Glass-Steagall? If we are going to allow large banks to exist, then their leverage must be reduced to the point where their failure would not risk the system and require taxpayer dollars. I don't care if that makes them less profitable. They are making those large profits because they have taxpayers implicitly behind them, and I get no dividend payments from them, the last time I checked. Where is Fannie and Freddie reform (and their breakup)? No mention of an exchange for credit default swaps? (And yes, I know that such an exchange would reduce the number of swaps and the profitability of them. That is the point. They are dangerous if allowed to become too big a market.) This bill reads as if bank lobbyists wrote it. Where is the populist outrage? We have let the fox set up the rules for running the hen house. Shame on us all if we allow this to happen.

Japanese Disease

I have written a lot over the past year about the problems facing Japan. Their population is shrinking, as is their work force. They are running massive fiscal deficits and have done so for almost 20 years. Government debt-to-GDP is now up to 178% and projected to rise to over 200% within a few years. They started their "lost decades" with a savings rate of almost 16%, and are now down to 2% as their aging population spends its savings in retirement. They have had no new job creation for 20 years, and nominal GDP is where it was 17 years ago.

As bad as our problems are here in the US, their bubble was far more massive. Values of commercial property fell 87%! Their stock market is still down 70%. They had twice as much bank leverage to GDP as the US. (Think about how bad off we would be if bank lending was twice as large and had even worse defaults and capital shortfalls!)

And yet, they Muddle Through. Productivity has kept their standard of living reasonable. Up until recently their exports were strong. The trading floors of the world are littered with the bodies of traders who have shorted Japanese government debt in the belief that it simply must implode. While I believe that it eventually will, if they stay on the path they are on, Japan is a very clear demonstration that things that don't make sense can go on longer than we think.

Richard Koo (chief economist of Nomura Securities, in Tokyo) argues passionately that Japan had a balance-sheet recession, and that the only way for Japan to fight it was to run massive deficits. Banks were not lending and businesses were not borrowing, as both groups were trying to repair their balance sheets, which were savaged by the bursting of the bubble. It is said that at one time the value of the land on which the Emperor's Palace sits in Tokyo was worth more than all of California. Clearly this was a bubble that puts our housing bubble to shame.

So, I understand the point that there are differences between Japan and the US . But there are also similarities. We too have had a balance sheet recession, although here it was mostly individuals and financial institutions that have had to retrench and repair their balance sheets.

Japan elected to run large deficits and raise taxes. As I wrote in the October 16th letter (http://www.2000wave.com/article.asp?id=mwo101609), "Savings equal Investments:

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is defined as Consumption (C) plus Investment (I) plus Government Spending (G) plus [Exports (E) minus Imports (I)] or:

GDP = C + I + G + (E-I)

I don't want to go on at length again, but basically, the literature I quoted suggests that government stimulus and deficits have no long-run positive effect on GDP. In fact, the work done by Christina Romer, Obama's chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, shows that tax cuts have a three-times-greater positive effect on GDP, and tax increases have the same level of negative effect.

In the equation above, if you increase government spending it will have a positive effect in the short run on GDP, but not in the long run. In essence, the increase in "G" must be made up by savings from consumers and businesses and foreigners.

But "G" does not enhance overall productivity. Government spending may be necessary but it is not especially productive. You increase productivity when private businesses invest and create jobs and products. But if government soaks up the investment capital, there is less for private business.

And that is Japanese disease. You run large deficits, sucking the air out of the room, and you raise taxes, taking the money from productive businesses and reducing the ability of consumers to save. Then you go for 20 years with little or no economic or job growth.

This is the path we currently seem to be on. The Japanese experience says that it could last a lot longer than people think before we hit the wall; because if savings rise in the US, and if banks, instead of lending, put that money on deposit with the Fed, as they are now doing (in order to repair their balance sheets), the US could run large deficits for longer than most observers currently believe.

We will need 15-18 million new jobs in the next five years, just to get back to where we were only a few years ago. Without the creation of whole new industries, that is not going to happen. Nearly 20% of Americans are not paying anywhere close to the amount of taxes they paid a few years ago, and at least ten million are now collecting some kind of unemployment benefits or welfare.

Choosing large deficits does not reduce the amount of pain we will experience, it just seemingly reduces it in the short term and creates the potential for a serious economic upheaval when the bond market finally decides to opt for higher rates. This path is a bad choice, but sadly, in reality it is one we could take.

The Glide Path Option

A glide path is the final path followed by an aircraft as it is landing. We need to establish a glide path to sustainable deficits (could we dream of surpluses?). That is because at some point there will be recognition, either proactively or forced upon us by the bond market, that large deficits are unsustainable in the long term.

If Congress and the president decided to lay out a real (and credible) plan to reduce the deficit over time, say 5-6 years, to where it was less than nominal GDP, the bond market would (I think) behave. Reducing deficits by $150 billion a year through a combination of cuts in growth and spending would get us there in five years.

The problem is that there is real pain associated with this option. Remember that equation above. Absent a growing private sector, if you reduce "G" (government spending) you also reduce GDP in the short run. You have to take some pain today in order to do that. But you avoid worse pain down the road: a bubble of massive federal debt that has to be serviced will be very painful when it blows up, as all bubbles do.

The Glide Path Option means that structural unemployment is going to be higher than we like (which is actually the case with all the options). And the large tax increases that come with this option will by their very nature be a drag on growth (and cause a double-dip recession in 2011). We can debate tax increases all we want, but I sadly think we will soon have a VAT tax. There are no good options. I just hope that we cut corporate taxes enough when we do create a VAT, that it will make our corporations more competitive, which will be a boost for jobs.

That's pretty much it. This is not a problem we can grow ourselves out of in the next few years. We have simply dug ourselves into a huge hole. This is not a normal recession. There is not a "V" ending to this recession. We are going to have deal with the pain. It will be the pain of reduced returns on traditional stock market investments, a lower dollar, low returns on bonds, European-like unemployment, lower corporate profits over the long term, and a very slow-growth environment. But if we choose this path, we will get through it in the fullness of time.

And of course, then we will eventually have to deal with the $70 trillion in our off-balance-sheet liabilities in Medicare and Social Security and pensions. Sigh. But that's for another time.

Philadelphia, Orlando, and Phoenix

I really am more optimistic than this letter makes me seem. But if you ignore reality, then you have no chance to figure out how to make the best of your situation. It is the efforts of hundreds of millions of individuals trying to make their own lot a little better than will get us back to a robust economy.

Monday I fly to Philadelphia and then the next day to Orlando for two speeches, and then the following week a quick trip to Phoenix, then home to start to plan for Thanksgiving. I will be in New York the first weekend of December (the 4th) for Festivus, a great fundraiser for kids sponsored by Todd Harrison and the team at Minyanville (http://www.rpfoundation.org/), Interestingly, they hold it every year at a "Texas" barbecue joint. Look me up if you are there.

Tiffani has been out the last two days of this week. She is due in seven weeks or less, and her hips are expanding. The pain is too much right now for her to walk up the stairs to the office, so she is working from home. The doctor says this is the one time that her pain is not a sign of something bad. She is being a trooper and not taking any pain meds.

It has been 30 years since I was around a pregnant lady for more than a few hours, and it does bring back some memories. Watching her grow and change has brought back the sense of awe over how our bodies are designed.

Ryan and Tiffani have decided on the name Lively for my first granddaughter, to add to the two new grandsons this year. From zero to three grandkids in just six months! Kind of makes me dizzy.

I really enjoyed my time in South America. Rio is quite beautiful and I want to go back and spend some time.

Have a great week. There will be enough good friends and family that I know I will. And tomorrow night I finally get to go to a Dallas Mavericks game. We may have a real team this year.

Your always optimistic at the beginning of the season analyst,

John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com

Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

Note: The generic Accredited Investor E-letters are not an offering for any investment. It represents only the opinions of John Mauldin and Millennium Wave Investments. It is intended solely for accredited investors who have registered with Millennium Wave Investments and Altegris Investments at www.accreditedinvestor.ws or directly related websites and have been so registered for no less than 30 days. The Accredited Investor E-Letter is provided on a confidential basis, and subscribers to the Accredited Investor E-Letter are not to send this letter to anyone other than their professional investment counselors. Investors should discuss any investment with their personal investment counsel. John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA), which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS), an FINRA registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. Millennium Wave Investments cooperates in the consulting on and marketing of private investment offerings with other independent firms such as Altegris Investments; Absolute Return Partners, LLP; Fynn Capital; Nicola Wealth Management; and Plexus Asset Management. Funds recommended by Mauldin may pay a portion of their fees to these independent firms, who will share 1/3 of those fees with MWS and thus with Mauldin. Any views expressed herein are provided for information purposes only and should not be construed in any way as an offer, an endorsement, or inducement to invest with any CTA, fund, or program mentioned here or elsewhere. Before seeking any advisor's services or making an investment in a fund, investors must read and examine thoroughly the respective disclosure document or offering memorandum. Since these firms and Mauldin receive fees from the funds they recommend/market, they only recommend/market products with which they have been able to negotiate fee arrangements.

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You have permission to publish this article electronically or in print as long as the following is included:

John Mauldin, Best-Selling author and recognized financial expert, is also editor of the free Thoughts From the Frontline that goes to over 1 million readers each week. For more information on John or his FREE weekly economic letter go to: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/learnmore

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PAST RESULTS ARE NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THERE IS RISK OF LOSS AS WELL AS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GAIN WHEN INVESTING IN MANAGED FUNDS. WHEN CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, INCLUDING HEDGE FUNDS, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER VARIOUS RISKS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT SOME PRODUCTS: OFTEN ENGAGE IN LEVERAGING AND OTHER SPECULATIVE INVESTMENT PRACTICES THAT MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF INVESTMENT LOSS, CAN BE ILLIQUID, ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PERIODIC PRICING OR VALUATION INFORMATION TO INVESTORS, MAY INVOLVE COMPLEX TAX STRUCTURES AND DELAYS IN DISTRIBUTING IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AS MUTUAL FUNDS, OFTEN CHARGE HIGH FEES, AND IN MANY CASES THE UNDERLYING INVESTMENTS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT AND ARE KNOWN ONLY TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGER.

John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA) which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) an NASD registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions.

Opinions expressed in these reports may change without prior notice. John Mauldin and/or the staffs at Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC may or may not have investments in any funds cited above. John Mauldin can be reached at 800-829-7273.


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Thoughts from the Frontline
3204 Beverly Drive
Dallas, Texas 75205

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Just Desserts and Markets Being Silly Again - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

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Volume 5 - Issue 51
November 3, 2009



Just Desserts and
Markets Being Silly Again
By Jeremy Grantham

My long time readers are familiar with Jeremy Grantham of GMO as I quote him a lot. He is one of the more brilliant and talented value managers (and I should mention very successful on behalf of his clients). He writes a quarterly letter which I regard as a must read. I have excerpted parts of his recent letter, where the chief investment strategist really takes the current financial system follies to task. Typical of his great writing and thinking is the quote from this week's Outside the Box selection:

"I can imagine the company representatives on the Titanic II design committee repeatedly pointing out that the Titanic I tragedy was a black swan event: utterly unpredictable and completely, emphatically, not caused by any failures of the ship's construction, of the company's policy, or of the captain's competence. "No one could have seen this coming," would have been their constant refrain. Their response would have been to spend their time pushing for more and improved lifeboats. In itself this is a good idea, and that is the trap: by working to mitigate the pain of the next catastrophe, we allow ourselves to downplay the real causes of the disaster and thereby invite another one. And so it is today with our efforts to redesign the financial system in order to reduce the number and severity of future crises."

You can get the full letter at www.gmo.com (You will have to register).

Your glad to be back home at least for a week,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

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Everbank


Just Desserts and Markets Being Silly Again

by Jeremy Grantham

Just Desserts

I can't tell you how surprised, even embarrassed I was to get the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Yes, I had passed the dreaded chemistry A-level for 18-year-olds back in England in 1958. But did they realize it was my third attempt? And, yes, I will take this honor as encouragement to do some serious thinking on the topic. I will also invest the award to help save the planet. Perhaps that was really the Nobel Committee's sneaky motive, since there are regrettably no green awards yet. Still, all in all, it didn't seem deserved. And then it occurred to me. Isn't that the point these days: that rewards do not at all reflect our just desserts? Let's review some of the more obvious examples.

1. For Missing the Unmissable

Bernanke, the most passionate cheerleader of Greenspan's follies, is picked as his replacement, partly, it seems, for his belief that U.S. house prices would never decline and that at their peak in late 2005 they largely just reflected the unusual strength of the U.S. economy. As well as missing on his very own this 3-sigma (100-year) event in housing, he was completely clueless as to the potential disastrous interactions among lower house prices, new opaque financial instruments, heroically increased mortgages, lower lending standards, and internationally networked distribution. For these accumulated benefits to society, he was reappointed! So, yes, after the fashion of his mentor, he was lavish with help as the bubble burst. And how can we so quickly forget the very painful consequences of the previous lavishing after the 2000 bubble? Rewarding Bernanke is like reappointing the Titanic's captain for facilitating an orderly disembarkation of the sinking ship (let's pretend that happened) while ignoring the fact that he had charged recklessly through dark and dangerous waters.

2. The Other Teflon Men

Larry Summers, with a Financial Times bully pulpit, had done little bullying and blown no warning whistles of impending doom back in 2006 and 2007. And, famously, in earlier years as Treasury Secretary he had encouraged (I hope inadvertently) wild and reckless financial behavior by helping to beat back attempts to regulate some of the new and most dangerous instruments. Timothy Geithner, in turn, sat in the very engine room of the USS Disaster and helped steer her onto the rocks. And there are several others (discussed in the 4Q 2008 Letter). You know who you are. All promoted!

3. Misguided, Sometimes Idiotic Mortgage Borrowers

The more misguided or reckless the borrowers, the more determined the efforts to help them out, it appears, although it must be admitted these efforts had limited effect. In comparison, those who showed restraint and either underhoused themselves or rented received not even a hint of help. Quite the reverse: the money the more prudent potential buyers held back from housing received an artificially low rate. In effect, the prudent are subsidizing the very same banks that insisted on dancing off the cliff into Uncle Sam's arms or, rather, the arms of the taxpayers - many of whom rent.

4. Reckless Homebuilders

Having magnificently overbuilt for several years by any normal relationship to the population, we have decided to encourage even more homebuilding by giving new house buyers $8,000 each. This cash comes partly from the pockets of prudent renters once again. This gift is soon, perhaps, to be extended beyond first-time buyers (for whom everyone with a heart has a slight sympathy) to any buyers, which would be blatant vote-buying by Congress. So what else is new?

5. Over-spenders and Under-savers

To celebrate the overwhelming consensus among economists that U.S. individuals have been dangerously overconsuming for the last 15 years, we have decided to encourage consumption and penalize savers by maintaining the aforementioned artificially low rates, which beg everyone and sundry to borrow even more. The total debt to GDP ratio, which under our heroes Greenspan and Bernanke rose from 1.25x GDP to 3.25x (without even counting our Social Security and Medicare commitments), has continued to climb as growing government debt more than offsets falling consumer debt. Where, one wonders, does this end, and with how much grief?

6. Banks Too Big to Fail

Here we have adopted a particularly simple and comprehensible policy: make them bigger! Indeed, force them to be bigger. And whatever you do, don't have any serious Congressional conversation about breaking them up. (Leave that to a few journalists and commentators. Only pinkos read pink newspapers anyway!) This is not the first time that a cliché has triumphed. This one is: "You can't roll back the clock." (See this quarter's Special Topic: Lesson Not Learned: On Redesigning Our Current Financial System.)

7. Over-bonused Financial Types

Just look at Goldman's recent huge "profits," two-thirds of which went for bonuses. It is now estimated that this year's bonus pool will be plus or minus $23 billion, the largest ever. Less than a year ago, these same guys were on the edge of a run on the bank. They were saved only by "government" - the taxpayers' supposed agents - who decided to interfere with the formerly infallible workings of capitalism. Just as remarkably, it is now reported that remuneration for the entire banking industry may be approaching a new peak. "Well, we got rid of some of those pesky competitors, so now we can really make hay," you can almost hear Goldman and the others say. And as for the industry's concern about the widespread public dismay, even disgust, about excessive remuneration (and, I would add, plundering of the shareholders' rightful profits)? Fuhgeddaboudit! In the thin book of "lessons learned," this one, like most of our other examples, will not appear.

8. Overpaid Large Company CEOs

Even outside the financial system, there are many painfully obvious unjust desserts in the form of top management rewards. And most of the excessive rewards come out of the pockets of our clients and other stockholders, which is particularly galling. When I arrived in the States in 1964, the ratio of CEO pay to the average worker was variously reported to be between 20/1 and 40/1. This seemed perfectly respectable and had held for the previous 30 years. By 2006, this ratio had exploded to between 400/1 and 600/1, which can only be described as obscene. The results certainly don't suggest such high rewards: a) 10-year stock market returns are close to zero in real terms; and b) U.S. GDP growth has finally slipped below its 100-year trend of 3.5%. After deducting the effect of the rampant increase in the financial system, the growth in GDP ex-finance has fallen to 3.1% since 1982 and well below 3% since 2000, all measured to the end of 2007 to avoid the recent crisis. The corporate system, to be frank, seemed to run faster and more efficiently back in the 1960s before CEOs and financial types began to gobble up other people's lunches. I suppose I have done my share of gobbling. But, it still ain't right!

9. Holders of the Stocks of Ridiculously Overleveraged and Wounded Corporations

Yes, I admit this is part envy and part hindsight investment regret. But, really, our financial leaders so overstimulated the risk-taking environment that junky, weak, marginal companies and zombie banks produced a record outperformance (the best since 1933) of junk over the great blue chips. (Ouch!) In a world with less moral hazard, which would be a world of just, although painful desserts, scores of these should-be-dead companies would be. As it is, they live to compete against the companies that actually deserve to be survivors. Excessive bailouts are just not healthy for the long-term well-being of the economy.

10. The Well-managed U.S. Auto Industry

While firms in other industries fail and their workers look for new jobs, the auto industry is rewarded by direct subsidized loans, governmental arm-twisting of creditors forced to settle far below their legal rights, and direct subsidies for their products. All of this for their well-deserved ranking as the most short-sighted industry of the last 20 (40?) years, and one of the worst managed.

11. The World's Most Over-vehicled Country

We chew up a dangerously large amount of Middle Eastern oil (and oil desperately squeezed from Canadian tar sands), which is ruinous for our globalpolitical well-being (and ability to avoid war) and also not so good for an overheating world. So the answer must be to subsidize more car purchases, and when the subsidies run out, you can have all the fun again. Good long-term thinking!

12. Stock Options

This, of course, is the crème de la crème of unjust desserts. Recent practices have basically been a legalized way to abscond with the stockholders' equity. So if the stock price crashes, perhaps with considerable help from management, that's all right - just rewrite the options at the new low prices. There has been no serious attempt to match stock option rewards (or total financial rewards for that matter) to the building of long-term franchise value. Instead, the motto is: grab it now and run! You can fill in your own favorite anecdotes here - there are so many of them!

13. Finally, Just in Case You've Forgotten, We Have My Old Nemesis, Greenspan

Alan Greenspan receives the title of Maestro in the U.S. and is knighted by the Queen for thoroughly demolishing the integrity of the U.S. financial system. He overtly ignored the great threat of bubbles in asset classes and, in fact, encouraged them. He Ayn Rand-ishly facilitated the progressive dismantling of governmental restrictions on financial behavior, he deliberately kept real interest rates at zero for years, etc., etc., etc. You have heard it before. Now, remarkably, in his very old age he has become imbued with the spirit of Hyman Minsky: "Unless somebody can find a way to change human nature, we will have more crises." Now he finally gets it. Too late! In his merely old age, he ignored or abhorred Minsky, and consistently behaved as though markets were efficient and the players were honest and sensible at all times. But for all of the egg on his face, the Maestro continues to consult with the rich and famous, considerably to his financial advantage. In the good old days, he would have been set in the village stocks, and not the kind you buy and sell. And I would have been right there, Alan, with very ripe tomatoes.

The Last Hurrah and Markets Being Silly Again

The idea behind my forecast six months ago was that regardless of the fundamentals, there would be a sharp rally.1 After a very large decline and a period of somewhat blind panic, it is simply the nature of the beast. Exhibit 1 shows my favorite example of a last hurrah after the first leg of the 1929 crash.

jmotb110309image001

After the sharp decline in the fall of 1929, the S&P 500 rallied 46% from its low in November to the rally high of April 12, 1930. It then, of course, fell by over 80%. But on April 12 it was once again overpriced; it was down only 18% from its peak and was back to the level of June 1929. But what a difference there was in the outlook between June 1929 and April 1930! In June, the economic outlook was a candidate for the brightest in history with effectively no unemployment, 5% productivity, and over 16% year-over-year gain in industrial output. By April 1930, unemployment had doubled and industrial production had dropped from +16% to -9% in 5 months, which may be the world record in economic deterioration. Worse, in 1930 there was no extra liquidity flowing around and absolutely no moral hazard. "Liquidate the labor, liquidate the stocks, liquidate the farmers"2 was their version. Yet the market rose 46%.

How could it do this in the face of a world going to hell? My theory is that the market always displayed a belief in a type of primitive market efficiency decades before the academics took it up. It is a belief that if the market once sold much higher, it must mean something. And in the case of 1930, hadn't Irving Fisher, arguably the greatest American economist of the century, said that the 1929 highs were completely justified and that it was the decline that was hysterical pessimism? Hadn't E.L. Smith also explained in his Common Stocks as Long Term Investments (1924) - a startling precursor to Jeremy Siegel's dangerous book Stocks for the Long Run (1994) - that stocks would always beat bonds by divine right? And there is always someone of the "Dow 36,000" persuasion higher prices in previous peaks must surely have meant something, and not merely have been unjustified bubbly bursts of enthusiasm and momentum.

Today there has been so much more varied encouragement for a rally than existed in 1930. The higher prices preceding this crash (that were far above both trend and fair value) had lasted for many years; from 1996 through 2001 and from 2003 through mid-2008. This time, we also saw history's greatest stimulus program, desperate bailouts, and clear promises of years of low rates. As mentioned six months ago, in the third year of the Presidential Cycle, a tiny fraction of the current level of moral hazard and easy money has done its typically great job of driving equity markets and speculation higher. In total, therefore, it should be no surprise to historians that this rally has handsomely beaten 46%, and would probably have done so whether the actual economic recovery was deemed a pleasant surprise or not. Looking at previous "last hurrahs," it should also have been expected that any rally this time would be tilted toward risk-taking and, the more stimulus and moral hazard, the bigger the tilt. I must say, though, that I never expected such an extreme tilt to risk-taking: it's practically a cliff! Never mess with the Fed, I guess. Although, looking at the record, these dramatic short-term resuscitations do seem to breed severe problems down the road. So, probably, we will continue to live in exciting times, which is not all bad in our business.

Lesson Not Learned: On Redesigning Our Current Financial System

I can imagine the company representatives on the Titanic II design committee repeatedly pointing out that the Titanic I tragedy was a black swan event: utterly unpredictable and completely, emphatically, not caused by any failures of the ship's construction, of the company's policy, or of the captain's competence. "No one could have seen this coming," would have been their constant refrain. Their response would have been to spend their time pushing for more and improved lifeboats. In itself this is a good idea, and that is the trap: by working to mitigate the pain of the next catastrophe, we allow ourselves to downplay the real causes of the disaster and thereby invite another one. And so it is today with our efforts to redesign the financial system in order to reduce the number and severity of future crises.

After a crisis, if you don't want to waste time on palliatives, you must begin with an open and frank admission of failure. The Titanic, for example, was just too big and therefore too complicated for the affordable technology of its day. Given White Star Line's unwillingness to spend, she was under-designed. The ship also suffered from agency problems: the passengers bore the risk of unnecessary speed and overconfidence in "too big to sink!" while the captain stood to be rewarded for breaking the speed record. No captain is ever rewarded for merely delivering his passengers alive. Greenspan, nearly 100 years later in his short-lived "irrational exuberance" phase, did not enjoy being metaphysically slapped by the Senate Subcommittee for threatening the then speedy progress of the economy. What is needed in this typical type of agency problem is for the agent on those rare occasions when it really matters, whether a ship's captain or a Fed boss, to stop boot licking and say, "No, this is wrong. It is just too risky. I won't go along."

We have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to effect genuine change given that the general public is disgusted with the financial system and none too pleased with Congress. I have no idea why the current administration, which came in on a promise of change, for heaven's sake, is so determined to protect the status quo of the financial system at the expense of already weary taxpayers who are promised only somewhat better lifeboats.

It is obvious to most that there was a more or less complete failure of our private financial system and its public overseers. The regulatory leaders in particular were all far too captured and cozy in their dealings with reckless and greedy financial enterprises. Congress also failed in its role. For example, it did not rise to the occasion to limit the recklessness of Fannie and Freddie. Nor did it encourage the regulation of new financial instruments. Quite the reverse, as exemplified by the sorry tale of CFTC Chairman Brooksley Born's fight to regulate credit default swaps.

But, at least now, Congress seems to realize the problem: the current financial system is too large and complicated for the ordinary people attempting to control it. Even Barney Frank, were he on his death bed, might admit this; and most members of Congress know that they hardly understand the financial system at all. Many of the banks individually are both too big and so complicated that none of their own bosses clearly understand their own complexity and risk taking. The recent boom and the ensuing crisis are a wonderfully scientific experiment with definitive results that we are all trying to ignore. And, except for bankers, who have Congress in an iron grip, we all want and need a profound change. We all want smaller, simpler banks that are not too big to fail. And we can and should arrange it!

Step 1 should be to ban or spin off that part of the trading of the bank's own money that has become an aggressive hedge fund. Proprietary trading by banks has become by degrees over recent years an egregious conflict of interest with their clients. Most if not all banks that prop trade now gather information from their institutional clients and exploit it. In complete contrast, 30 years ago, Goldman Sachs, for example, would never, ever have traded against its clients. How quaint that scrupulousness now seems. Indeed, from, say, 1935 to 1980, any banker who suggested such behavior would have been fired as both unprincipled and a threat to the partners' money. I, for one, saw Goldman in my early days as a surprisingly ethical firm, at worst "long-term greedy." (This steady loss of the old partnership ethic is typically underplayed in descriptions of Goldman.) Today, Goldman represents a potential hedge fund trade as being attractive precisely because they themselves have already chosen to do it. These days, all - or almost all - large banks do proprietary trading that is pure hedge fund in nature. Indeed the largest bank, Citi (owned by us taxpayers), is gearing up to substantially increase its aggressive prop trading as I write. ("No, no, we're not!")

Some insiders have argued that we should not worry about prop trading because they claim it did not play an important part in the recent crisis. I think this is completely wrong for it misses the very big picture. Prop trading can easily introduce an aggressive hedge-fund type mentality into the very hearts of what ideally should be conservative, prudent - even boring - banks. This hedge fund mentality became a dominant organizing principle, particularly with respect to compensation practices. It encouraged personal aspirations over corporate goals and invited bonus-directed behavior at the clients' expense and ultimately, as we have seen, at the taxpayers' expense to rid itself of this problem. All Congress has to overcome is the lobbying power and campaign contributions of the finance industry itself, which I admit is no small feat. In a bank with a hedge fund heart, you can't reasonably expect ethical or non-greedy behavior, and you haven't seen it.

Of course, commercial and investment banks need to invest their own capital. They probably should have the right to do genuine hedging against investments that flow naturally from their banking business. As for the rest, they could easily be required either to limit the leverage used on prop desk trading or to be restricted to investing in government paper and, at the very least, play by the same rules as other hedge funds. What they certainly should insurance, as is now the case.

In the early 1930s, following the famous Pecora hearings, the conflict of interest between the management of other people's money as fiduciary and the business of dealing and underwriting in securities was considered so inimical to the public interest that Congress almost compelled separation of proprietary trading and client trading. Close, but no cigar. Instead, Glass-Steagall made the probably less useful step of separating commercial and investment banking. Unfortunately, they left intact the obvious conflict between the banks' managing their own money and simultaneously that of their clients. We now have a unique opportunity to revisit this matter.

(As we ponder the problem of prop trading, let us consider Goldman's stunning $3 billion second quarter profit. It appeared to be almost all hedge fund trading. Be aware also that this $3 billion is net of about $6 billion reserved for future bonuses. Goldman's CEO had, in fact, the interesting job of deciding how much of this $9 billion profit would be arbitrarily awarded to shareholders. [In this case, one-third. Could be worse!] This means that they extracted every penny of $9 billion from a fragile financial system. "Good for them," you may say, and they indeed are very smart. But surely they should not have been insured against failure by us taxpayers! Remember, they are now also a commercial bank yet very, very little of their $9 billion came from making loans. Three months later their bonus pool for the year is estimated to be a new record at $29 billion. And the whole banking industry is back to a new record for remuneration. How resilient! How remarkable! How basically undesirable for our economy!)

In Step 2, the Justice Department, together with Congressional and other advisors, should be invited to develop a special set of rules for the banking industry that recognizes the moral hazard of "too big to fail." If really too big to fail, banks should be divided by Justice into manageable, smaller pieces that can indeed be allowed to fail. With these two steps and possibly with an intelligent son of Glass-Steagall, the deed would be done! Regulators would have a fighting chance of being able to regulate, unlike their recent woeful past. If an angel appeared, waved his wings and, lo, it was so, almost every single Congressman would sigh with relief.

The separation of commercial banking from investment banking is not as vital as the removal of prop desk complicated enterprises both smaller and simpler, which characteristics I for one believe are probably essential if we are to avoid further disasters. So what is the problem? The argument against all major changes, without at least some of which we will soon surely be back in another crisis, is always the same. "Oh, you can't roll back the clock." But, even repeated twice before every breakfast, it is not persuasive. Why exactly can't you roll back the clock? We did it once before and, although it was very imperfect and probably missed the central point of conflict of interest, it still produced an improved system that was successful enough for 50 years. In general, countries with simpler and less aggressive banks have had much less pain in the recent crisis while we were pawning the Crown Jewels - sorry, the Federal Jewels - to bail out aggressive bankers who were out of their depth in the new complexities.

Step by step, even as the complexity grew, our regulatory leaders enabled systemic risk to grow. They continued to push the boundaries for banks by allowing more leverage, new instruments, and less control. The details are familiar. All this was done in the name of untrammeled, unfettered capitalism, and almost all of it was a bad idea.

"Oh!" say the bankers, "If we become smaller and simpler and more regulated, the world will end and all serious banking will go to London, Switzerland, Bali Hai, or wherever." Well, good for those other places. If that means they will have knee-buckling, economy cracking, taxpayer-impoverishing meltdowns every 15 years and we will be left looking like a boring back water, that sounds fine to me. Remember, just like our investment management branch of the financial system, banking creates nothing of itself. It merely facilitates the functioning of the real world.

Yes, of course every country needs a basic financial system to function effectively with letters of credit, deposits, and check writing facilities, etc. But as you move beyond that it is worth remembering that every valued job created by financial complexity is paid for by the rest of the real economy, and talent is displaced from real production, as symbolized by all of the nuclear physicists on prop trading desks. Viewed from the perspective of the long-term well-being of the whole economy, the drastic expansion of the U.S. financial system as a percentage of total GDP in the last 20 years has been a drain on the health and cost structure of the balance of the real economy. To illustrate this point, in 1965 the financial sector of the economy took up 3% of the GDP pie. The 1960s were probably the high water mark (or one of them) of America's capitalism. They clearly had adequate financial tools. Innovation could obviously have occurred continuously in all aspects of finance, without necessarily moving its share of the economy materially over 3%. Yet by 2007 the share had risen to 7.5% of GDP!

The financial world was reaching into the GDP pie and taking an unnecessary extra 4%. Every year! This extra rent is enough to lower the savings and investment potential of the rest of the economy. And it shows. As mentioned earlier, the growth rate of the GDP had been 3.5% a year for a hundred years. It had proven to be remarkably robust. Even the Great Depression bounced off it, and soon GDP growth was back on the original trend as if the Depression had never occurred. But after 1965, the growth of the non-financial slice, formerly 3.4%, slowed to 3.2%. After 1982 it dropped to 3.1% and after 2000 fell to well under 3%, all measured to the end of 2007, before the recent troubles. These are big declines. It is as if a runner has a growing and already heavy blood sucker on him that is, not surprisingly, slowing him down. In the short term, I realize that job creation in the financial industry looked like a growth driver, as did the surge in financial profits (which we now realize were ludicrously overstated). But in the long term, like a sugar high, this stimulus was temporary and unhealthy.

The financial system was growing because it could. The more complex and confusing new financial instruments became the more "help" ordinary citizens needed from the experts. The agents' interests were totally unaligned with the principle/clients' interests. This makes a mockery of "rational expectations" and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which assumes (totally unproven, as usual) equivalent and perfect knowledge on both sides of all transactions. At the extreme, this great advantage in knowledge and information held by the financial agents has the agents receiving all the rewards, according to the recent work3 by my former partner, Paul Woolley, and his colleagues at the Woolley Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality. (With a great name like that their job is half done before they start.)

The second problem, right on the heels of the too-big-and complicated issue, is that of inadequate public oversight. Even with existing institutions, we would have avoided most of the recent pain, borne by taxpayers, if we had had better public leadership. Yes, the public bodies had flaws, but the individuals running the shop had far bigger flaws. Greenspan, with arguably the most important job in the world, simply did not believe in interfering with capitalism at all. His regulatory colleagues such as Bernanke and Geithner fell into line without any challenges. And Congress, strongly influenced by the financial industry, or merely misguided, or often both, facilitated the approach that capitalism in general and banking in particular would do just fine if left entirely alone. It was a very expensive error. Does anyone think we would have run off the cliff with even one change - Volcker at the Fed? I, for one, am confident that we would have done far less badly.

Behind this weakness in the recent cast of characters is a systemic (suddenly the trendiest word in the English language) weakness in our method of job selection. How can Greenspan, with his long-established record of failure as a professional economist, have resurfaced as the Fed boss? With no record of success in any important job, he gets one of the world's two most important jobs! Now we have to decide how much more decision-making power to give to the Fed - an institution with a 25-year proven record of failure. How can we separate the logical neatness of institutional design from our recent proven inability to pick effective, principled leaders with strong backbones?

It is a conundrum: too many regulatory agencies and you have too many opportunities for financial interests to shop around for regulatory bargains and to find and exploit the ambiguous seams between them. Too few agencies and we run the risk of my worst nightmare: waking up and finding Alan Greenspan with twice the authority!

At the least we must recognize the improbability of acquiring great leaders and that our financial system must be simple and robust enough to withstand the worst efforts from time to time of poor or even bad leadership. A simpler, more manageable financial system is much more than a luxury. Without it we shall surely fail again. And it looks as if we are bound and determined to bend once again to the will (and the money) of the financial lobby, which is encouraged by the unexpected conservatism of the current administration's "Teflon" men. They seem terrified to make any substantial changes. And the one person with the character to make tough changes - Paul Volker - is window dressing, exactly as I suggested in January. A sad, wasted opportunity!

Summary

  • Yes, this was a profound failure of our financial system.
  • The public leadership was inadequate, especially in dealing with unexpected events that often, like the housing bubble breaking, should have been expected.
  • Of course, we should make a more determined effort to do a more effective job of leadership selection. But excellence in leadership will often be elusive.
  • Equally obvious, we could make a hundred improvements to the lifeboats. Most would be modest beneficial improvements, but in the long run they would be almost completely irrelevant and, worse, they might kid us into thinking we were doing something useful!
  • But all of the above points fail to recognize the main problem: the system has become too big and complicated for even much-improved leaders to handle. Why should we be confident that we will find such improved leaders? For, even in an administration directed to "change," Obama and his advisors fell back on the same cast of characters who allowed, even facilitated, the development of the current crisis. Reappointing Bernanke! What a wasted opportunity to get a "son of Volker" type. (Or should that be "grandson of Volker?")
  • The size of the financial system continues to grow and shows every sign of being out of control. As it grows, it becomes a bigger drain on the rest of the economy and slows it down.
  • The only long-term hope of avoiding major recurrent crises is to make our financial system simpler, the units small enough that they can be allowed to fail, and, above all, to remove the intrinsically conflicted and dangerously risk-seeking hedge fund heart from the banking system. The rest is window dressing and wishful thinking.
  • The concept of rational expectations - the belief in the natural efficiency of capitalism - is wrong, and is the root cause of our problems. Hyman Minsky, on the other hand, was right; he argued that the natural outcome of ordinary people interacting is to make occasional financial crises "well nigh inevitable." Crises are desperately hard to avoid. We must give ourselves a chance by making the job of dealing with them much, much easier.
  • All in all we are likely to have learned little, or rather to act, through lack of character, as if we have learned nothing. In doing so we are probably condemning ourselves to another serious financial crisis in the not too- distant future.

PS: As quite often happens, since I write painfully slowly (even without extra tick-borne delays), a professional slipped in with a great column that gets to the heart of this matter. Please read John Kay in the Financial Times of July 9. It is short and persuasive. "Our banks are beyond the control of mere mortals" - now, that's what I call a title!


Footnotes:

1 Erratum: Last quarter I cast mild aspersions on Finanz und Wirtschaft by suggesting that I had not precisely said that the S&P would scoot rapidly up to 1100; I remembered it more as between 1000 to 1100. Never mess with a Swiss journalist: this one duly pointed out that his tape of April 1 confirmed his accuracy. Either way, here we are, more or less (at 1098 on October 19).

2 Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, 1931.

3 Biais, Bruno; Rochet, Jean-Charles; and Woolley, Paul. Rents, Learning and Risk in the Financial Sector and other Innovative Industries. September, 2009. Working Paper Series 2009, The Paul Woolley Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality.

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/paulWoolleyCentre/news/RentsLearningAndRisk.htm



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John F. Mauldin
johnmauldin@investorsinsight.com
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